THE POWER OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS AS GATEKEEPERS: Duties, Conflicts of Interest, and the Rights of Commercial Users in the Digital Context
Digital platforms, Gatekeepers, Duty of loyalty, Neutrality, Digital due process, Self-preferencing, Ex ante regulation, Digital Markets Act, Competition and innovation, Rights of commercial users
This dissertation critically analyzes the economic power exercised by digital platforms in their role as gatekeepers, focusing on duties of loyalty, neutrality, and transparency, as well as on the rights of commercial users in the digital market. It investigates how the activities of these platforms, which simultaneously act as intermediaries, regulators, and competitors, generate structural conflicts of interest and may distort competition, particularly through practices such as self-preferencing and strategic use of data. The research examines whether and how these platforms should be held accountable for the exercise of their power, considering the need for ex ante regulatory instruments and a digital due process that ensure predictability, contestability, and competitive balance without hindering innovation. Using international experiences such as the Digital Markets Act (DMA) as a reference, the dissertation aims to propose regulatory guidelines that identify the instruments already existing within Brazilian legislation capable of meeting the need to impose duties and obligations on platforms in their relationships with commercial users, thereby contributing to the protection of competition and the rights of economic agents in the digital environment.