"CADE’s Structuralist Approach to Merger Control: An analysis of its recent enforcement vis-à-vis the leading American schools".
Competition policy; merger control; Harvard School; Chicago School; Law No. 12,529/2011; Administrative Council for Economic Defense; merger control cases.
The hypothesis of this study is that the Administrative Council for Economic Defense’s (CADE) merger control under Law No. 12,529/2011 is essentially structuralist, contrary to the rhetoric of a supposed hegemony of the Chicago approach in Brazil. In order to analyze such hypothesis, a literature review is developed regarding the main American antitrust schools, as well as a normative and empirical analysis of the current Brazilian merger control. For this purpose, this study presents the paradigms proposed by the Harvard and Chicago schools regarding the American antitrust policy, especially in relation to merger control. The historical background and legacies of these schools are also covered. Next, an analysis of the Brazilian normative, constitutional, legal and infra-legal set of rules, which guides CADE's antitrust analysis regarding merger control, is presented. Finally, the abovementioned hypothesis is tested based on a statistical study of CADE's decisions on merger control cases between the years 2015 and 2022, verifying and weighing the structural analysis vis-à-vis the analysis of efficiencies performed by the Brazilian antitrust authority. The results of the present study indicate that in its merger control CADE tends to give greater importance to structural analysis, and that efficiencies, although accepted, are not usually sufficient for the agency to approve mergers without restrictions.