"Law as a Word – Philosophies of Language, Theories of Law and Judicial Decision".
contemporary law; philosophies of language; theories of law; judicial decision; linguistic turn; postmetaphysical thinking.
What does the linguistic turn have to say for law? Since the mid-twentieth century, theories of law have sought to overcome its metaphysical foundations that were once provided by natural law. The formulation of increasingly sophisticated and analytically consistent theoretical models would be able to ensure that law was now in line with the demands of the so-called postmetaphysical thinking, which marks Western contemporary philosophy. At the same time, this task would be undertaken without abandoning the moral, prescriptive and/or deontological standards that are responsible for the very meaning of law. However, judicial decisions show that, in reality, these theoretical archetypes do not always fulfill themselves in the empirical dimension of legal experience. Apparently, this disparity calls for a more accurate philosophical clarification about language itself. Therefore, this dissertation’s first chapter will analyze some of the philosophies of language that were decisive for the linguistic turn – both phases of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thought, the philosophical path trailed by Martin Heidegger, the critical appropriation of language by Ferruccio Rossi- Landi’s Marxist philosophy and, finally, the pluralistic and negative perspective towards language in Julio Cabrera’s philosophy. The second chapter, driven by the thoughts exposed in the first, will address some of the most relevant and prominent theories of law since the overcoming of natural law – legal positivism in the works of both Hans Kelsen and Hebert Lionel Adolphus Hart, Ronald Dworkin’s legal post-positivism, Jürgen Habermas’s discourse and procedural theory, the particular interpretation of law in Brazil by Marcelo Neves and, at last, Theodor Viehweg’s legal topics model. The third and final chapter will analyze examples of Brazilian judicial decisions that use legal language in the most surprising, unpredictable and exotic ways possible, many of which are not easily assimilated by most of law’s current theories. In the end, it will be stated that – once again, in the realm of so-called postmetaphysical thinking – law’s deontological and moral meaning must necessarily occur by means of a more precise and correct elucidation of language – both in terms of its internal perplexities and in what relates to its abyssal and profound structural distortions.