CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND ALGORITHMS: The applicability of the right to privacy to the use of algorithms in policing.
Criminal proceedings, algorithms, right to privacy, policing.
This research was motivated by the perception that the right to privacy in criminal proceedings has not been keeping pace with the fast digitization of life. Despite the obvious applicability of privacy rights to personal data processing, in criminal proceedings, the right to privacy does not present itself as an instrument of regulation or constraint of the power of the police to manage algorithms. From these issues, the guiding question for this research was outlined: Where does the legal theory of privacy stand in relation to new technologies in criminal proceedings? By legal theory of privacy, I mean what I have identified as the theoretical common sense of jurists on the right to privacy in the criminal field. The technological phenomenon problem was narrowed down to algorithms in policing. Methodologically, I acknowledge the quality of the criminal procedure doctrine (chapter two) as a means to an end but I deny its analytical potential. This led me to search for the material effects of criminal proceedings instead of the theoretical ones. Prior to the discussion on algorithms in policing, three focuses of analysis were addressed: the theoreticalpolitical background on the right to privacy (chapter three), the Brazilian historical-social construction post-abolition (chapter four), and an empirical approach to police practices in the management of intimacies (focused on home invasions) in the context of the war on drugs (chapter five). After studying algorithms (chapter six), I tackled its most pressing problems: opacity/transparency, data quality, and racial bias. I also examined governance, information management, and the dispute for informational capital in the field of public security (chapter seven). The general argument leads to a proposition: the right to privacy must have a normative force on algorithmic policing. To sustain it, I analyze the social relations in the world of big data with regard to corporeality, the exercise of intimacies as a source of resistance or domination, and the role of individualism in the non-recognition of the collective as a subject entitled to the right to privacy (chapter eight). The right to privacy does not prevent the dogmatic approach in criminal proceedings from sustaining the conditions to maintain the criminal management of intimacies in the hands of the police. Currently, the war on drugs is the stage for this historical reality. As the right to privacy begins to be timidly applied to constrain police power, such as home and cellphone searches – subsequent to the racial studies –, new possibilities for surveillance appear on the technological horizon, such as algorithms. In contrast to its power to “imprison” subjectivities, a right to privacy also emerges, with the potential to protect the collective, intersubjective and immaterial level of life. This means a right to privacy able to also protect personal information under police systems, rather than protect only private property related to individualized crime procedures.