Legal certainty in the system of legal principles: does the traditional conception of legal certainty still have a aplication in legal theory?
Legal security. System of principles. Conceptual fallibility. Reconception.
This thesis addresses legal certainty within the scope of the system of principles of law, aiming to examine, more specifically, whether it is possible to obtain it when the judicial decision is based on principles of a principled nature, bearing in mind that the open texture These rules make it impossible to obtain, in advance and safely, the possibility of predicting the result by the jurisdiction. In fact, due to the oscillating or zigzagging jurisprudence of the courts, especially within the scope of the Supreme Court of the Brazilian judiciary, criticism regarding the existence of legal uncertainty in decisions based on constitutional principles is recurrent. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the reasons for this state of insecurity and, especially, whether the traditional conception of legal security, formatted in the context of classical positivism, is appropriate in modern law, in which the principles have acquired full normativity, as referenced by Ronald Dworkin's theory of law. This is because, verifying the fallibility of the traditional conceptual assumptions of security is a fundamental assumption for confronting this problem, so that an adequate conception can be reconstructed in the context of principled law, which can, in fact, contribute to greater control of the judicial discretion and, therefore, for the promotion of the democratic rule of law.