"Economic Power and Political Power in Brazilian Competition Law: an analysis based on Economic Sociology and the Constitutional Economic Order".
Economic power. Political power. Competition law. Economic Sociology. Constitutional Economic Order.
Administrative Council for Economic Defense.
This master thesis seeks to lay out the sociological and legal-constitutional grounds that support a comprehensive, coherent and effective approach by competition law in the control of economic power, given the strong relational context of the Brazilian economy and the current scenario of consolidation of private economic power in contemporary capitalist democracies. The increasing and alarming economic power concentration distorts not only the competitive environment, but also seriously affects the integrity of the Brazilian political and democratic system, as it entitles economic elites to privileged access to political and governmental entities and, thereby, to undue economic advantage. The range of effects resulting from the market power concentration goes beyond the purely economic sphere and, as it impacts diverse dimensions of social life, it should also broaden the notion of economic power as understood by the Brazilian competition law. The sociological conception of markets and the crony capitalism in Brazil articulate a theoretical and empirical framework that highlights the essential role of social relations in the structuring of the market economy and the economic performance of private agents. Therefore, competition law must grasp the close relations that bind economic power and political power in Brazilian capitalism and promote the untangling of these ties in the merger control review, as a requirement to ensure its own effectiveness and the protection of competition on the merits. The Brazilian Constitution legitimate and validate such approach, as it institutes an economic order based on principles that require considering political and social values for an effective protection of the competitive process aimed at repressing the abuse of economic power. From these reflections and theoretical bases, the study proceeds to an empirical analysis of the decisions ruled by the Administrative Council for Economic Defense’s Board in merger control cases, in order to observe if the competition authority apprehends political ramifications in market power analysis. The results converge with the working hypothesis that a superficial conception of economic power, guided by Chicago School antitrust theory, may have limited the perception and incorporation of the political effects of market power concentration into the competition analysis.