Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI): The Ephemeral Right of the Parliamentary Minority and the Legislature's Quasi-Typical Power-Duty
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY, PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATION, PARLIAMENTARY MINORITIES, OPPOSITION RIGHTS, PROTECTION OF MINORITIES
Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry (CPIs) are widely acknowledged in Brazilian jurisprudence and doctrine as a subjective public right of parliamentary minorities. Nonetheless, recent practice (v.g. CPMI Vegas, CPI do Futebol, CPI da Pandemia and CPMI dos Atos de 8 de Janeiro), researchers closer to the CPIs and the perception of its own agents (Parliament members and public seveants) reveal that minorities remain unprotected after a Committee is established: they lack means to investigate, to elect or nominate leadership positions (Chair, Vice-Chair, and Rapporteur), to set up agendas, to approve requests for persons and papers, and to influence the final report (paradox). This study examines (i) three paradigms - constitutional, statutory, and comparative law - to shed light on the nature of federal CPIs in Brazil, (ii) three misteries underlying its paradox; and (iii) three solutions to the related challenge. As per the first paradigm, the text of the Brazilian Constitution is robust and authentic, granting CPIs powers akin to judicial authorities, mentioning other powers to be fixed by the Rules of Congress (House and Senate), and envisioning a mediate purpose to promote civil and criminal liability. By contrast, the statutory framework is so called chaotic, lacking specific and modern regulation, resulting in an almost absolute agenda-setting power for the Commission Chair, an inadequate regency by norms of Committees in general and Plenary, and a problematic supplementary application of the Criminal Procedure Code. As per comparative law, certain jurisdictions, such as Germany and Portugal, offer enhanced protections for parliamentary minorities in CPIs, ensuring effective rights to produce evidence, greater representation in leadership positions, and stronger influence over outcomes. The study posits that the root cause of this paradox lies in three mysteries of Brazilian CPIs: (i) their effective integration into the legislative process, which shall attract what is comprehended as a due legislative process doctrine, oriented to safeguard fundamental rights; (ii) the ephemeris nature of this parliamentary minority right, openly recognizing the absolute absence of protection ex post; and (iii) their function as genuine investigative bodies (with the fundamental distinction between accountability and investigation), including a criminal scope, which leads to a semi typical power of the Brazilian Congress, essential to safeguard the independence and harmony of the branches of government. To address these issues, three remedial paths are proposed: (i) reform of internal rules to guarantee minority protections, such as binding minority orders for papers and persons, and a duty to send minority reports to authorities; (ii) voluntary self-regulation adopted by CPI members, implementing the suggestions hereto; and (iii) judicial measures (v.g. writs of mandamus) filed by affected parliamentarians before the Supreme Federal Court. Ultimately, Brazil’s constitutional text on CPIs is among the most robust and progressive worldwide, although there is a relevant incongruity with existing statutory regulation. demands urgent attention to safeguard the legitimate role of parliamentary minorities. The remedial paths proposed do not bring a great novelty as per the advances already found in foreign jurisdictions, place pros and cons, and some reasonable uncertainty regarding implementation, however the present study at least fulfills its purpose to put the topic into debate for academia and CPIs’ agents.