Banca de DEFESA: ALEXANDRE FREITAS COUTO

Uma banca de DEFESA de DOUTORADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
STUDENT : ALEXANDRE FREITAS COUTO
DATE: 16/09/2025
TIME: 18:00
LOCAL: REMOTA
TITLE:

CAN IT EVER BE LEGITIMATE TO EVADE TERM LIMITS?

KEY WORDS:

Comparative Constitutional Law; Presidential Term Limits Evasion; Legitimacy; Minimum Core of Democracy; Unamendability; Constituent Power.

PAGES: 239
BIG AREA: Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
AREA: Direito
SUMMARY:

Nowadays, almost all Constitutions adopt presidential term limits. There are plenty of detailed and well-elaborated works that examine this phenomenon. However, few studies (if any) aim to make an analysis of the legitimacy of presidential term limits evasions. That is the purpose of this work: to demonstrate that, in order to fully comprehend, analyze, investigate, or take a position on the legitimacy of a presidential term limits evasion, it is necessary to consider three different concepts of legitimacy: legal, sociological, and moral (or democratic). Some presidential term limits evasions may be legally illegitimate but sociologically legitimate, for instance. Others may be legally and sociologically legitimate, but immoral (or undemocratic). Building on these concepts, I propose a framework that serves to evaluate the legitimacy of various political acts, including constitutional changes and constitution-making. Drawing on selected cases involving presidential term limits evasions, I step into a blurry terrain that considers the possibility that, under specific and exceptional circumstances, it may be democratic to break the law. I explain why exploring such a controversial terrain is sometimes necessary.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Externo à Instituição - RAUL SANCHEZ URRIBARRI - UB
Interno - 1905321 - GUILHERME SCOTTI RODRIGUES
Presidente - 2492387 - JULIANO ZAIDEN BENVINDO
Externa à Instituição - ROSALIND DIXON - UNSW
Externo à Instituição - ZACHARY ELKINS - UTA