Non-Reasoning Pacts: Why and for Whom Do Judges Decide?
Judicial Reasoning; Non-Reasoning Pacts; Judicial Litigation; Coordination; Cooperation; Precedents.
Judicial reasoning is in crisis in the country. This diagnosis is as widely shared as it is misleading. As litigation becomes increasingly widespread at all branches of the judiciary, the demand for greater quantitative specialization also grows, with a focus on delivering swift judgments with a multiplying effect, supported by continuous technological and technical innovations. These changes make courts appear more closely to the operations of a well-oiled machine than with the romantic vision of courtrooms filled with brilliant orators, who, by the power of their rhetoric, build the foundations of the law. From a certain perspective, judicial reasoning in Brazil fully meets the expectations placed upon it, in accordance with institutional programs and reforms implemented since the country’s re-democratization, especially after Constitutional Amendment No. 45. The present study aims to explore what we have lost in this process and how the frequently noted flaws in the way Brazilian judges and courts justify their decisions can be traced back to strategic specializations of these judges, in response to a challenging reality and the positive and negative incentives put in place, as well as to systematic failures of coordination and cooperation among the various actors involved in the litigation environment.