Actions against the Federal Public, Institutional Tensions and Legislative Deference: Implications of the Theory of Institutional Dialogues in light of the federal court order regime
Writs of Payments; Institutional Tensions; Institutional Dialogues; Passive Virtues
This present dissertation aims to discuss the institutional conflict between the Federal Supreme Court and the National Congress in the constitutional interpretation of the federal writs of payment regime. The aim was to examine how the Supreme Court has behaved in the face of these conflicts, both from the perspective of possible judicial activism in its first interventions in the matter, and from a more self-contained position, in full exercise of a passive virtue, culminating in deference to the Legislative Power through the delay in analyzing actions aimed at combating these norms, a delay that ends up giving priority to the Public Treasury. In order to ascertain the existence, or not, of an institutional dialogue between legal powers in relation to this matter, the examination was restricted to Amendments 30, 62, 113 and 114, as well as the respective control actions concentrated movements against these constitutional changes