Banca de DEFESA: Luciana Braga dos Santos

Uma banca de DEFESA de DOUTORADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
STUDENT : Luciana Braga dos Santos
DATE: 03/12/2025
TIME: 11:00
LOCAL: Plataforma Teams - https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3ameeting_MDcwNzg4NWItNWU2MC00M2M1LT
TITLE:
THE GOVERNABILITY AND GOVERNANCE OF THE BRAZILIAN PUBLIC BUDGET

KEY WORDS:
Public governance, governability, public budget, public choice theory, institutional theory

PAGES: 100
BIG AREA: Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
AREA: Administração
SUBÁREA: Ciências Contábeis
SUMMARY:

This thesis aimed to analyze the interrelationships between public governance models and the management of the Brazilian budgetary process, highlighting how the budget is configured, in practice, as an instrument of governability and political coordination through which the public administration and society articulate in pursuit of the public interest and the generation of collective benefits. Based on the premise that the budget reflects not only technical decisions but also political disputes and negotiations, the study sought to understand how institutional arrangements and governance practices influence the allocation and execution of public resources. The research examined the historical evolution of the Brazilian public budget from the military regime to the present, with emphasis on the transformations introduced by the 1988 Constitution and, particularly, on the institutional change consolidated from 2015 onward, when the country shifted from an authorizing model to a mandatory (impositive) one. This shift expanded the Parliament’s role in resource allocation, altered the balance of power among branches of government, and intensified the political dimension of budget execution. Theoretically, the study was grounded in Rational Choice Theory and Public Choice Theory, applied to explain the behavior of political and bureaucratic actors in the budgetary process. Complementarily, it incorporated contributions from Institutional Theory and Agency Theory, which help elucidate principal–agent relations, accountability mechanisms, and institutional isomorphism processes that shape public governance. Methodologically, a qualitative approach was adopted, combining a literature review with semi-structured interviews conducted with 14 specialists in public administration, budgeting, and governance. The interviews were processed and analyzed using the IRaMuTeQ software, employing content analysis and lexical similarity techniques. The results show that the Brazilian budgetary process is marked by persistent structural and institutional problems that undermine efficiency, transparency, and equity in public management. Obstacles such as patrimonialism, budgetary rigidity, normative instability, and limited transparency—constrained by technical language and informational asymmetry—were identified as barriers to effective social oversight. The study found that budgetary governance is hybrid: although grounded in a solid technical and normative framework, it remains strongly influenced by political incentives and interinstitutional bargaining, resulting in resource fragmentation and low-quality public spending. Strengthening budgetary governance therefore requires not only technical and legal improvements but, above all, the consolidation of institutional mechanisms capable of reducing information asymmetries, discouraging opportunistic behavior, and promoting greater transparency, integrity, and accountability. The findings also indicate that a regressive tax system, subsidies, and tax expenditures without consistent evaluation reduce the redistributive capacity of the budget. The study concludes that improving governance is essential to enhance governability and the quality of public spending, demanding classification reforms, greater integration among control mechanisms, and the implementation of systematic evaluations of parliamentary amendments. This thesis contributes by demonstrating that Brazilian budgetary governance is simultaneously technical and political, and that this duality explains institutional fragmentation, low spending efficiency, and the difficulties of state coordination. By integrating Public Choice Theory, Institutional Theory, and Agency Theory with empirical evidence from expert interviews, the study offers an analytical framework capable of elucidating the incentives and asymmetries that shape the budgetary process, while pointing to pathways for strengthening transparency, integrity, and accountability in public management.


COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Externo à Instituição - GONZALO ALVES DE SOUZA SANTINHA - UA
Presidente - 1454420 - ANDRE NUNES
Externo à Instituição - FERNANDO DE SOUZA COELHO - USP
Interno - ***.901.671-** - JOSE MATIAS PEREIRA - UnB
Externo à Instituição - PAULO RESENDE DA SILVA - UEVORA
Notícia cadastrada em: 01/12/2025 18:27
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