Accountability in Partnerships Between Social Assistance CSOs and the Social Assistance Fund of the Federal District: An Agency Theory Perspective
Social Assistance; Civil Society Organizations; Monitoring; Agency
Theory; Accountability
The dissertation analyzes public spending on social assistance in the Federal
District, focusing on voluntary transfers made by the Social Assistance Fund of the
Federal District (FAS/DF) to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), aiming to assess
accounting compliance and the effectiveness of accountability in these partnerships.
Grounded in Agency Theory, the research examines the relationship between the
principal (FAS/DF) and the agents (CSOs), highlighting the challenges of monitoring,
information asymmetry, and interest alignment in the implementation of public social
assistance policies. The study analyzed collaboration agreements signed between
2017 and 2024, using documentary research and a quantitative approach based on
panel data analysis and econometric modeling to identify the factors that influence
the time required for the review of accountability reports. The results reveal a high
concentration of resources in a small number of organizations, reinforcing the need
for greater diversification and transparency in the selection criteria of partner entities.
Statistical analyses indicated that technical monitoring significantly influences the
duration of accountability assessments, while the volume of resources and the
number of addenda showed no statistically significant relationship. The research
concludes that the main challenge for FAS/DF lies not in increasing control but in
improving its quality, promoting greater administrative efficiency and strengthening
accountability in relations with the third sector.